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RECENT DECISIONS
Selective Service: Judicial Review of Classification
Defendant, a conscientious objector, was convicted for failure to register for
the draft. While serving a sentence in a Federal penitentiary, he was registered
(without his cooperation) with his local draft board by the prison warden. After
his release he received several forms from his local draft board, which he returned
unfilled, accompanied by letters explaining his position. He was subsequently
convicted under section 12(a) of the Universal Military Service and Training
Act, 62 STAT. 622 (1948), 50 U. S. C. Appendix § 462(a) (1952), for failure
to obey an order to report for induction. It is undisputed that the letters contained
substantially all the information required by the questionnaires, and on the basis
of which he would have been entitled to a classification of IV-D, or in any event
of 1-S. Held: where the defendant not only failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies but ignored the whole remedial process altogether, he cannot attack the
validity of an induction order and obtain a judicial review of his classification.
United States v. Palmer, 223 F. 2nd 893 (3rd Cir. 1955).
The rule that one must first exhaust his administrative remedies before
resort can be had to the courts has been well established, Dundee Mortgage Trust
Invest. Co. v. Charlton, 32 Fed. 192 (C. C. D. Ore. 1887); Meyers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938), and has received ready application by
the courts with respect to review of Selective Service cases. Estep v. United States,
327 U. S. 114 (1946). The present Selective Service Act, 62 STAT. 604
(1948), as amended 65 STAT. 75 (1951), like its predecessors, has no provision
for judicial review, though section 6(j) provides for review of a local draft board's
classification by a board of appeal. 62 STAT. 612 (1948), 50 U. S. C. Appendix
§ 456(j) (1952). Selective Service Regulations, promulgated under the authority
of § 10 of the Act, 62 Stat. 87 (1951), 50 U. S. C. Appendix § 460 (1952),
provide that a conscientious objector who has been wrongly classified may appeal
to the President where one or more members of the board dissented from such
classification. 32 C. F. R. § 1627. 3 (Rev. 1954). The courts, however, have not
interpreted the silence of the Act as completely precluding judicial review, but
have allowed it in cases where the local board lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction,
Estep v. United States, supra, as where classification of a registrant had no basis in
fact; see Russel, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the United
States, 20 Gno. WAsH. L. REV. 409 (1952). Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S.
549 (1944), made it dear, however, that administrative appeals and excess of
jurisdiction notwithstanding, a registrant was not entitled to contest his classification in a criminal prosecution for failure to report for work of national importance
until he had taken all administrative steps; the order to report was not the final
step, since he would have had a physical examination when he reported to camp.
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The reason for requiring that all steps be taken was that Congress wanted to do
away with "litigious interruption in the process of selection." Falbo v. United
States, supra.
The Falbo case was followed by a long line of decisions dealing with the
problem of what constituted the required final step. In Estep v. United States,
supra, where the registrant had exhausted his administrative appeals and appeared
at the induction center but refused to be inducted, he was considered to have taken
the final step. Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542 (1944), required the defendant
to do everything except take the oath. Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S. 338
(1946), cited by the dissent for the proposition that one does not have to obey
an order for induction to be entitled to question the draft board's denial of
exemption from military service, is not inconsistent with the preceding cases. The
Selective Regulations in effect at that time did not provide for a physical examination upon reporting to work camp, so that the final step was a pre-induction
physical examination. In each case resort must be had to the Regulations in effect
at the time to determine the final step. Contra:Ex Parte Fabiani,105 F. Supp. 139
(3rd Cir. 1952).
The minority in the instant case would have required the local draft board to
fill out defendant's form on the basis of facts contained in his letters. They cited a
regulation which provides, " . . . The local board will receive and consider all
information . . . presented to it." 32 C. F. R. § 1622-1(c) (Rev. 1951).
There are no other cases interpreting this regulation in this way.
As harsh as the result may seem, the Selective Service Regulations provide
for a physical examination at the induction center, where the registrant may still
be rejected, S. R. 615-180-1 § 35(a) April 1953). Palmer would probably
have received a complete physical examination, not having taken one before
classification, and thus had a good chance of being rejected. Had he reported for
induction and examination, he would probably have been allowed to plead his
classification regardless of not having exhausted his intermediate appeals; the
dissent seems correct in asserting that the induction order obviated the necessity
for taking the intermediate administrative appeals.
Tamara S. Pasichniak
Slander of Title
Plaintiff claimed that defendant had disparaged her title by maliciously
recording a notice of pendency of an action, when defendant knew that he had no

